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Abstract 
 
The juridical structure involves the choice of a 
legal model formed by abstraction, or 
idealization, of the legislative project. The goal of 
this paper is to identify the cultural and 
psychological factors of the many-sided criticism 
of the idea of the rule of law, which is 
fundamental for constitutional state. 
Methodology: a concrete historical method was 
used to analyze the variety of criticism of the idea 
of the rule of law from Karl Marx to the present, 
excluding the concept of denial of law. Results: 
unlike criticism by Marx and Mannheim of law in 
terms of ideology, contemporary theorists 
criticize the idea of the rule of law from their own 
psychological and cultural positions such as 
ignoring the role of specific socio-cultural 
conditions that generate special legal norms and 
relations, is often exploited to position these 
norms and relations as natural and universal. In 
   
Аннотация 
 
Юридическая конструкция предполагает 
выбор правовой модели, которая 
формируется путем абстракции, то есть 
идеализации законодательного проекта. Цель 
данного исследования – выявить культурные 
и психологические факторы разносторонней 
критики идеи верховенства закона, 
являющейся основой правового государства. 
Методология: при помощи конкретно-
исторического метода проанализированы 
варианты критики идеи верховенства закона 
от Карла Маркса до современности, исключая 
концепции отрицания права. Результаты: в 
отличие от критики Марксом и Мангеймом 
права с точки зрения идеологичности, 
основным духовным фактором критики права 
в современном обществе является 
игнорирование роли конкретных 
социокультурных условий, порождающих 
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the opposite case, the existence of universal legal 
knowledge (epistemic relativism associated with 
the relativity of the existence of legal facts) and 
universally valid legal norms (moral and legal 
relativism associated with the relativity of the 
meanings of legal ideas, concepts and norms) is 
denied, since ideas and values always depend on 
the views of cognitive or moral subject. 
Conclusion: while modern law and society need 
multidimensional criticism from different 
perspectives, then the idea of the rule of law 
requires protection in the framework of the theory 
and philosophy of law.  
 
Key Words: Legal consciousness, relativism, the 
rule of law, habitualization, juridical structure. 
 
 
 
особые правовые нормы и отношения, 
которое позволяет позиционировать эти 
нормы и отношения как естественные и 
универсальные. В противоположном 
варианте отрицается существование 
универсального правового знания 
(эпистемический релятивизм, связанный с 
относительностью существования 
юридических фактов) и общезначимых 
правовых норм (морально-правовой 
релятивизм, связанный с относительностью 
значений правовых идей, понятий и норм), 
поскольку идеи и ценности всегда зависят от 
точки зрения познающего или морального 
субъекта. Вывод: если современное право и 
общество нуждаются в многомерной критике 
с различных позиций, то идея верховенства 
закона требует защиты в рамках теории и 
философии права. 
 
Ключевые слова: Правосознание, 
релятивизм, верховенство закона,, 
хабитуализация, юридическая абстракция. 
 
Resumen 
 
La construcción legal implica la elección de un modelo legal que se forma por abstracción, es decir, la 
idealización del proyecto legislativo. El observatorio de este estudio es identificar los factores culturales y 
psicológicos de la crítica versátil de la idea de la primacía de la ley, que es la base del estado de derecho.  
Metodología: con la ayuda del método específico e histórico, se analizaron las opciones para criticar la idea 
de la primacía de la ley desde Marx hasta la actualidad, excluyendo los conceptos de negación de ley.  
Resultados: a diferencia de la crítica de Marx y Mannheim de la ley desde el punto de vista de la ideología, 
el principal factor espiritual de la crítica de la ley en la sociedad moderna es ignorar el papel de las 
condiciones socioculturales específicas que generan normas y relaciones jurídicas especiales, lo que 
permite posicionar estas normas y relaciones como naturales y universales. En la opción opuesta se niega 
la existencia de un conocimiento jurídico universal (relativismo epistémico relacionado con la relativa de 
la existencia de hechos jurídicos) y normas jurídicas de carácter general (relativismo moral y jurídico 
relacionado con la relativa de los valores de las ideas, conceptos y normas jurídicas), ya que las ideas y 
valores siempre dependen del punto de vista del sujeto cognitivo o moral.  
Conclusión: si el derecho moderno y la sociedad necesitan críticas multidimensionales de diferentes 
posiciones, la idea de la primacía de la ley requiere protección dentro de la teoría y filosofía del derecho.  
 
Palabras clave: Conciencia jurídica, el relativismo, primacía de la ley, habitualización, abstracción legal. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although recent literature broadly discusses the 
future of the global governance (Oberoi, 2017), 
the value relativism is a significant factor in the 
escalation of the risks of legal consciousness 
deformation while critique of the idea of the rule 
of law (Wilkinson, 2019). The Mannheim 
Paradox, which consists in the fact that since any 
thinking depends on the socio-cultural context, 
Mannheim’s own conclusions were 
predetermined by this context. Hence, no system 
of thought is more or less correct than any other. 
Mannheim provided his own problematic method 
of combating social conditioning, but the 
postmodern idea that all thinking is distorted, 
relative and contains significant flaws has led to 
the popularization of the idea of abandoning 
metanarratives, which also relate to legal norms. 
Postmodernism can be assessed as the most 
ambitious of metanarratives, a kind of inverted 
metaphysics – a homogeneous universe of 
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“similar interests”, ironically very close to the 
Kantian concept of noumen in that the essence of 
the subject will always be beyond human 
consciousness. Beliefs are illusions, delusions 
and an incomplete reflection of a much more 
complex reality, making social agents to apply 
the “Othering” (Khan, 2018) psychological 
mechanism. Under the guise of abandoning 
meta-tales, “identification becomes less stable 
“(Frolova, 2018, p. 26) postmodernism offers its 
own grandiose narrative that can overshadow 
many works aimed at exposing and “correction” 
of social inequality.  
 
Therefore, if all the allegations are equally false, 
then sexism and racism have a value equal to 
feminism and the civil rights movement, and the 
offense is equal to the struggle for freedom, as is 
customary to say in criminal circles. Moreover, 
sometimes this post-modernist relativism often 
looks more convincing than the propaganda of 
traditional legal values or their rational criticism. 
After all, if all knowledge systems and social 
relations are equally illusory, then there is no way 
to engage in systemic criticism, because what we 
perceive as a way out of false consciousness is a 
form of our enslavement to them. So, the media 
channels, it would seem, are free from the 
imposition of ideology, however, regularly 
reproducing the picture of violations in the state 
apparatus and law enforcement agencies, they are 
quite actively involved in the formation of legal 
consciousness and its deformations. These 
deformations include “the underdevelopment of 
legal consciousness and the positivist approach 
to the law, according to which the only basis for 
law is the state or the will of the legislator 
(Sirazetdinova & Lukmanova, 2016, p. 373). 
 
The aim of the research was to indicate how faith 
in the legal order diverges from social and legal 
practice and what negative consequences this has 
on legal consciousness. 
 
Methodology 
 
The idea of the rule of law is criticized for its 
naive view of the law, according to which the 
content of the law does not depend on the social 
context in which the law operates. According to 
K. Mannheim, all historical and political thought 
is determined by the socio-historical location of 
the thinker, and therefore all thinking systems are 
inherently value-loaded, one-sided, distorted, or 
false (Mannheim, 1945). Following Mannheim’s 
idea, the legal consciousness of each individual 
is determined by certain socio-historical and 
economic situation, which brings the process of 
legitimization of political and legal institutions 
closer to the rationalization and habitualization 
of everyday socio-cultural practices.  
 
The concrete historical method was used in the 
analysis of socio-cultural factors of refraction of 
the risk phenomenon in the legal consciousness 
of a modern individual; it allowed us to identify 
the conditions for the emergence and 
establishment of legal awareness in a risk. 
 
Results  
 
In addition to obvious boundaries and 
prohibitions, legal systems are an influential 
source of social norms and ideas that filter how 
people perceive and understand reality. The 
influence of law permeates our daily experience. 
Interaction with law is part of everyday life: these 
are all the usual daily calls for law-abiding 
behavior in official and unofficial life. They 
come in the form of rhetoric of judicial debates, 
advice of lawyers to clients, information on the 
interaction between the police and suspects, 
employers and employees, creditors and debtors, 
or actors depicting the respective characters.  
 
Sometimes, ways of discussing law (legal 
discourses) reflect ordinary ideas – common 
sense, for example: “the employer has the right 
to control what is happening on the computer 
screen of the employee, which is his own 
property”. In whatever form legal discourses are 
presented, they help to comprehend what we 
understand as legal reality. They outline roles 
such as “owner” and “employee,” and describe 
how to behave in a particular role. A person who 
acts as an “employee” is subordinate, but has his 
own powers and rights to protect privacy. In 
addition, the channels through which relations 
between an employee who has certain rights and 
obligations are regulated with others (contracts 
with customers, partnerships with other 
companies, internal corporate rules) emerge. 
 
Legal norms divided the world into categories 
that filter individual experience, dictating the 
perception of anti-legal actions as something 
inevitable or as outrageous injustice, which must 
be countered as illegally imposed. In a broader 
sense, law and legal discourse affect the way we 
define concepts such as equality, freedom and 
justice, which are intertwined with the perception 
of morality. For example, a starving woman who 
steals bread for survival is a criminal by law. 
However, an employer who pays the employee 
less than the profit that he makes or not in 
accordance with the agreed amount may receive 
praise for his ingenuity in improving the 
profitability of the business.  
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Thus, law is especially convincing in comparison 
with the concepts of law, morality and religion, 
since it is often considered as a wall between 
order and chaos (Hobbes, 2012). For this reason, 
existing legal norms and relations can be 
perceived as undeniable because of their need in 
a social order. Hence, a clear, concise and 
detailed legal regulation of all types of legal 
relations and legal phenomena is extremely 
important, since the ability to explicitly represent 
certain social groups, criminalize or legalize 
behavior and norms through penetration into 
influential discursive networks makes the law an 
inalienable means of perpetuating social 
inequality and social injustice.  
 
In opposite to the concepts of constitutionalism 
and legal order (Amhlaigh, 2016), for Marx, the 
ideology of abstract formal equality in capitalist 
societies overshadows and thus supports real 
inequality. The state abolishes, in its own way, 
differences in birth, social rank, education, and 
profession when it proclaims that birth, social 
rank, education, and occupation are non-political 
differences. The state proclaims that regardless 
of these differences, each member of the nation 
equally participates in the fate of state 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the state interprets 
education and the profession as private property 
(Afridi, 2017) and ignores the types of inequality 
generated by private property, education, and the 
profession. Formal equality, therefore, remains 
an abstraction.  
 
Legal norms that are widespread on a global 
scale proclaim individual freedom and formal 
equality, but act in such a way that they only 
mask social and economic oppression, which is 
also widespread in liberal democracies. Legal 
discourse to a large extent depends on ideology 
in the Marxist sense: “the thoughts of the ruling 
class are dominant thoughts in every era” (Marx, 
2004, p. 14).  
 
However, if law is only a “tool for expressing 
class domination” (Engels, 2002), then this 
phenomenon most likely refers to the rank of 
privileges. If law inevitably constitutes by ideas 
emanating from power relations, then the law has 
no justification – moral or institutional. If law 
depends on the legal ideology, then the legality 
of a particular act or institution looks conditional 
and unprincipled. If the law reflects only the 
interests of the authorities (it is a privilege), then 
this is an expression of power, not law. 
 
The law, in contrast to privilege, not only takes a 
formal and normative form, but also subordinates 
power to itself. Moreover, legal ideology itself is 
not just an invention; it reflects real social 
conditions and reflects them. The idea of equality 
before the law, for example, is caused by the 
realities of capitalist economic relations and 
reflects them, even if it is formal and incomplete 
equality. Consensus in society will not be 
reached if the legal ideology has nothing to do 
with the social conditions that it is trying to 
justify. 
 
In the legal context, discourses focus on the 
concepts of formal equality, individualism, 
freedom of contract and private property, which 
ensure the actual existence of exploitative 
relations inherent in the capitalist type of 
production, gender hierarchies, racial inequality 
and other forms of social inequality. Even the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United 
Nations General Assembly, 1948) does not 
provide us with a universal definition of human 
rights, the source of rights and the role of the state 
in their protection. Moreover, states with their 
interests influenced the process of developing the 
Declaration. Although this information is widely 
available, a significant part of the texts of the 
declaration is silent about these problems. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration and similar 
documents are perceived by a large number of 
people as universal. 
 
The definitions of equality and freedom in liberal 
legal systems base on rather abstract definitions 
of individualism and formal equality, avoiding 
the coverage of the problems of deep inequality 
and social injustice present in these societies. 
Thus, social inequality is viewed as constantly 
changing, but it always includes categorizing 
people into groups, some of which receive 
privileges at the expense of others. It is generally 
accepted that women, sexual minorities, and 
indigenous peoples are among the latter. The 
forms of privileges are diverse: economic, legal, 
social, technological. Perhaps binary oppositions 
of gender and national minorities and majorities 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 122) are a systemic effect, 
reflecting the separation of interests of privileged 
from interests of systematically suppressed large 
groups of people. 
 
The concept of legal equality is similar to that 
defined by abstracting the concepts of economic, 
political, social and cultural contexts of equality. 
According to the ideology of the rule of law, 
everyone is equal in law, despite the existence of 
factual inequality, many of the aspects of which 
are caused or supported by this very law (legal 
norms and relations), just like the metaphysical 
concept of God is used in the Christian tradition 
described above. Millions of people lose billions 
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of dollars as a result of financial crises, the 
deliberate concealment of financial frauds that 
have contributed to terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and widespread tax 
evasion, while yet no organization or its 
leadership was punished in any legal way. There 
have been very few prosecutions and criminal 
sentences against large financial institutions or 
their leaders. 
 
The largest corporations dominate legal 
resources, while millions of people do not have 
access to adequate legal assistance. Hence, it is 
inevitable that legal institutions do not do enough 
to eliminate anti-legal phenomena. A 
corporation, as a subject of law, surpasses a 
specific person who is also a subject of law, and 
looks like the institutionalization of a 
transcendent, eternal legal personality, built in 
the image and likeness of a collectivist 
community. Like gods, corporations act through 
their “worldly” representatives from the common 
people (production and advertising). 
 
Thus, an impoverished employee and a giant 
multinational corporation are formally equal as 
subjects of law, but the latter has much higher 
real opportunities to protect their own interests. 
With rare exceptions, law enforcement officials 
are required to enforce the terms of the contracts, 
since the content is agreed upon by two or more 
free and autonomous persons. However, freedom 
to conclude a contract ignores the number of 
contracts, similar to labor contracts, which are 
not voluntary, but dictated by the need to meet 
basic needs or asymmetric relations between 
parties such as the employer and the employee. 
Wage work does not ensure the acquisition of 
personal property and freedom, since ordinary 
employees do not participate in the distribution 
of profits, they produce capital that exploits wage 
labor, as a result of which for the most part they 
do not have a chance to rise to the position of 
capitalist (Marx & Engels, 2014) or increase 
private property.  
 
The number of people employed in corporations 
and the volume of surplus value produced a huge 
gap between the remuneration of those at the top 
and the bottom of the corporate ladder. This 
division also applies to those employed in the 
field of legal services, where the salaries of high-
level employees (the size of which significantly 
exceeds the profit they can make) of a large 
corporate law firm depend on the extraction of 
surplus value through low-level employees, 
including lawyers, and companies that do not 
have corporate and elite customers are constantly 
in search of random “one-time” customers. This 
creates the risk of providing inadequate legal 
assistance to the most vulnerable citizens of 
society, since the protection of individual 
interests without huge resources is systematically 
overlooked by lawyers seeking income and 
prestige, achievable within corporate legal 
practice. The pricing on the legal services market 
is such that millions of the most disadvantaged 
individuals in the system of society are cut off 
from quality legal services. 
 
On the contrary, high corporate incomes make it 
possible to protect resources, use groups of 
lawyers concentrating on a common goal, and 
perform, in particular, unjustified and frivolous 
legal actions aimed at increasing interest in 
corporate capital. Therefore, a treaty is, rather, 
still not a document reflecting the actual nature 
of the legal relations of free and autonomous 
subjects of law, but an abstraction necessary for 
the exchange of goods (Pashukanis, 1980, p. 90), 
the “glue” of capitalism (Anderson, 1974, p. 
101). Nevertheless, the treaties refer to a “sense 
of social solidarity”, the text is designed to 
present the market as an arena of mutual respect, 
protected in court, in which people can 
purposefully create their collective destiny 
through joint activities. In any case, participants 
in legal relations support the system by virtue of 
the belief in its justification and viability. 
 
Modern critics of the concept of legal equality 
also argue that social hierarchies are implicitly 
supported by the concept of equality, at least in 
relationships such as racial (Daum & Ishiwata, 
2010, p. 844) and gender (Akimova, 2018). In 
addition, formal equality does not provide any 
compensation for harm to those who are 
systematically oppressed by the unequal 
application of the law, because formal equality is 
in no way aimed at ensuring social equality, and 
therefore does not provide a remedy to those who 
have been disadvantaged by legislative policy. 
For example, Australian Aborigines demanded 
compensation for the forced resettlement of their 
families by the state, since this policy led to a 
violation of the principle of equality before the 
law and a sharp reduction in their numbers. These 
arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court 
because no evidence of intent to destroy the 
racial group was found (Marchetti & Ransley, 
2005, p. 543). Formal equality, therefore, does 
not provide protection against systemic 
discrimination, masks real inequality, 
asymmetric relations and limits the 
understanding of equality to an abstract 
definition.  
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Individualism emerged while competition for the 
accumulation of property, which would ensure 
the individual autonomy of specific groups. 
Therefore, the concept of individual autonomy 
mystifies the economic relations that underlie 
legal ones. Eugene Pashukanis explains that legal 
relations are very similar to commodity ones. 
The exchange of goods is positioned as an 
exchange of equal things, independent of the 
conditions of their production (Pashukanis, 1980, 
p. 111); similarly, legal relations are considered 
as interactions between equal people, 
independent of their position in the social 
hierarchy. Thus, the provision of legal relations 
is positioned as impartial, but in fact is based on 
“the organized power of one class over another” 
(Pashukanis, 1980, p. 119), as a large amount of 
resources opens up the possibility of using 
privileges, influencing political and legal 
systems, the media, and art.  
 
Conversely, the most exploited and 
impoverished workers, such as those from 
banana plantations in Nicaragua, have limited 
access to educational resources, and many are 
forced to leave school early for work. The lives 
of the exploited and in more prosperous states 
consist of little more than work and sleep. 
Consequently, those with privileges are better 
aware of the sources of dominant legal ideas and 
approved norms, the ways of developing and 
restricting the operation of these norms, and have 
more opportunities to establish rules. 
 
Discussion 
 
A review of legal processes represents law as a 
neutral mechanical application of the rules in 
accordance with the rule of law without taking 
into account social consequences, although 
lawyers are not mechanics involved in the repair 
of things, but rather social masters involved in 
human affairs. For these reasons, formal equality 
is described by many as a legal ideology. Legal 
activities and any legal processes cannot be 
“sterile” in relation to cultural, economic and 
historical contexts, including the views of judges, 
although transparency reduces corruption 
practices and enhances “public trust and 
legitimacy on the local governments” (Furqan & 
Din, 2019, p. 13). 
 
As a rule, even lawyers have quite a few current 
tasks that limit the critical consideration of legal 
discourses in conjunction with legal practice. 
Those involved in the analysis of legal activity, 
as a rule, focus on the idea of formal equality, 
subjects of law and features of certain areas of 
law, in particular, property rights and contract 
law. Each of the lawyers, of course, is aware of 
the most popular objects of critical research, and 
various approaches to the interpretation of this 
object. Lawyers can be faithful to the law, 
exaggerating the advantages and not paying 
attention to the shortcomings of law as an object 
of peculiar attachments: everything that is good 
and permissible is prescribed in the law, and the 
law does not suffer from disadvantages (legal 
idealism). Although this may be an exaggeration, 
most authors in the field of jurisprudence do not 
pay attention to the crucial role of legal norms, 
legal relations and legal practice in maintaining 
the status quo. Several exclusions highlight the 
role of escalation of violence in media and 
creative arts, for instance, “violence towards a 
person in art is horrifying when the spectator is 
not one of those who assert himself through 
violence and dismisses the boundaries of 
decency and the rule of law” (Stoletov et al., 
2019, p. 249). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The ignoring of the specific socio-cultural 
conditions and social hierarchy that give rise to 
special legal norms and relations, makes these 
norms and relations to seem natural and/or 
universal. These historical and hierarchical social 
relations are legitimized or discarded in the 
process of formalization. The law appears as a 
product of some universal authoritative system of 
thinking (in particular, within the framework of 
subjective legal concepts), which is located 
above and above all subjects of law, and not as 
determined by the contingent of subjects of law 
and lends itself to different ways of 
interpretation. Being in such a framework, legal 
consciousness is limited in the ability to rethink 
the social order and, in particular, the legal order, 
which is a risk factor. 
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